

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-10 EUR-12 NEA-11 ISO-00  
CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 IC AE-00  
INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15  
HA-05 MCT-01 /111 W  
-----078102 120536Z /16

O 120437Z MAY 78 ZDK  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1317  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE  
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01923

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA  
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: NEXT STEPS

1. AT BRITISH REQUEST, AMBASSADOR MCHENRY AND POLITICAL  
OFFICER MILLER MET PM MAY 11 WITH BRITISH MISSION  
OFFICERS RICHARDSON AND FYGIS-WALKER, BOTH  
REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP, TO DISCUSS NEXT  
STEPS ON NAMIBIA. (AMBASSADOR MURRAY HAS ALREADY LEFT  
FOR HIS NEW POST IN GENEVA AND AMBASSADOR BROWN, HIS  
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REPLACEMENT, IS STILL GETTING ACQUAINTED.) THE BRITISH  
DESIRE FOR THIS INFORMAL DISCUSSION STEMMED FROM THEIR  
MISSION'S NEED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR DAVID OWEN FOR  
HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH ZAMBIAN  
PRESIDENT KAUNDA (LEST OWEN GO OFF LIKE AN UNGUIDED  
MISSILE).

2. BRITISH BEGAN CONVERSATION BY SHOWING US A CABLE WHICH THEY HAD SENT TO LONDON CONTAINING THEIR OWN INITIAL COMMENTS ON NEXT STEPS. IN THAT CABLE THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE NEED FOR FAIRLY RAPID ACTION BY THE FIVE TO KEEP OUR INITIATIVE MOVING FORWARD. THEY SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT OWEN MIGHT RAISE WITH KAUNDA THE IDEA OF HOLDING A FRONTLINE SUMMIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRESUMABLY WITH PARTICIPATION OF SWAPO AND POSSIBLY THE FIVE. THEIR FEAR IS THAT A LULL IN OUR INITIATIVE WILL RESULT SIMPLY IN INCREASED VIOLENCE IN NAMIBIA AND IN SOUTH AFRICAN MOVEMENT TOWARD AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. THEY INDICATED THAT THE FIVE SHOULD CONSIDER AN EARLY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT A DEMARCHE BE MADE TO SOUTH AFRICA BY THE UK ALONE BECAUSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE MORE LIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE UK THAN THE FIVE.

3. WITHOUT RESPONDING DIRECTLY TO THE ABOVE VIEWS, AMBASSADOR MCHENRY OFFERED SOME PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF WHERE OUR INITIATIVE NOW STANDS. MCHENRY SUGGESTED THAT ANY ASSESSMENT DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE OF DAMAGE, BOTH REAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WHICH HAS OCCURRED TO THE INITIATIVE AS A RESULT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID.

A) REAL DAMAGE. THE REAL DAMAGE WILL NOT BE FULLY  
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KNOWN UNTIL MORE ACCURATE INFORMATION IS RECEIVED ON THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA, PROBABLY SOMETIME WEEK. SWAPO'S INITIAL REACTION WAS ONE OF STUNNED SILENCE. NEWS REPORTS WERE JUST BEGINNING TO FILTER OUT. A MORE EMOTIONAL REACTION COULD BE EXPECTED ONCE PICTURES, NEWS FILM AND EYE WITNESSES TELL THE STORY. IN ADDITION, CURRENT ESTIMATES OF OVER 500 DEATHS WOULD INDICATE THAT A SEVERE BLOW HAS BEEN DEALT TO THE NUCLEUS OF SWAPO'S POLITICAL CADRE AND THIS FACT ALONE MIGHT MAKE SWAPO LESS INCLINED TO SETTLE NOW;

B) PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE. MORE WILL BE KNOWN ON THIS AS WE GET REPORTS ON DEMARCHES BY THE FIVE TO THE FRONTLINE STATES AND AS SWAPO'S VIEWS SOLIDIFY; HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING IS KNOWN:

-- SWAPO IS NOW ABLE TO ARGUE WITH SEEMING REASON THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL IS NOT GENUINE AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT;

-- SWAPO IS LIKELY TO USE ATMOSPHERE OF DISTRUST TO  
ARGUE FOR ALTERATIONS IN THE PROPOSAL, INCLUDING:  
(A) CHANGE IN LOCATION OF SAG RESIDUAL FORCE;  
(B) MORE PRECISION IN DESCRIBING RELATION-  
SHIP BETWEEN UNSR AND AG, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF  
STEYN'S ACTIONS IN ROUNDING UP SWAPO LEADERS.  
(C) INCREASED SAFEGUARDS ON POLICE;

-- SWAPO IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT ON  
WALVIS BAY AND WITH EMPHASIS NOW ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN  
TROOPS STATIONED THERE;

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-- AFRICAN STATES ARE MORE LIKELY NOW TO SUPPORT SWAPO'S  
RESERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSAL.

-- IN ADDITION, AFRICAN STATES WILL BE RELUCTANT  
TO PRESS SWAPO IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY  
APPEARANCE OF REACTING TO SOUTH AFRICAN PRESSURE. THERE

IS LIKELY TO BE LITTLE SUPPORT FOR AN EARLY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. ALREADY THERE IS DISCUSSION OF WAITING UNTIL AFTER THE OAU MEETING (SCHEDULED FOR JULY) AND OF THE NEED TO MAKE SOME KIND OF ALTERATION IN THE PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A "FIG LEAF" FOR SWAPO ACCEPTANCE.

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-- AT THE SAME TIME THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE LIKELY INCREASINGLY TO MAKE NOISES ABOUT THE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD. THEY DO NOT YET REALIZE THE ENORMITY OF THEIR BLUNDER AND CONTINUE THEIR DEFIANT STATEMENTS.

4. AMBASSADOR MCHENRY CONCLUDED THAT, GIVEN THE ABOVE, THERE APPEARS AT THE MOMENT NO WAY THAT THE FIVE CAN GET ANYTHING THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND, WHILE WE SHOULD HOPE FOR MORE, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT WE CAN DO MORE THAN A DAMAGE-LIMITING EXERCISE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE. MCHENRY CAUTIONED AGAINST FLAILING AROUND IN THE NAME OF MOMENTUM, AND HE SPECIFICALLY COUNSELED AGAINST UK SUGGESTION THAT THEY ALONE SPEAK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

5. WITH THE BRITISH IN AGREEMENT WITH MUCH, THOUGH NOT ALL OF ABOVE, WE DISCUSSED THE KINDS OF DAMAGE-LIMITING EFFORTS THE FIVE MIGHT MAKE, WITH THE REALIZATION THAT SUCH EFFORTS WOULD HAVE TO BE BEGUN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE AGREED THAT EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THREE FRONTS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WE NEED TO IMPRESS UPON THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE NEED TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO ASSIST IN IMPROVING THE CLIMATE. SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS MIGHT INCLUDE:

- (1) RELEASE OF THOSE WHO HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DETAINED;
- (2) REPEAL OF THE TERRORISM ACT AND OTHER REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION;
- (3) RECOGNITION THAT SOUTH AFRICAN DEADLINE FOR INDEPENDENCE (DECEMBER 31, 1978) CAN NOT NOW BE

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MET. (IN THIS CONNECTION, NAMIBIAN GROUPS SHOULD BE PERSUADED TO ADVISE SAG THAT THEY WOULD FAVOR A DELAY IN THE INDEPENDENCE DATE.)

IN ADDITION, SOUTH AFRICAN RESTRAINT MUST, OF COURSE, BE ENCOURAGED, AND BELLICOSE STATEMENTS BY DEFENSE MINISTER BOTHA AND OTHERS MUST BE DISCOURAGED. (THE RELEASE OF SWAPO DETAINEES AND THE REPEAL OF RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION WOULD REPRESENT A 180 DEGREE TURN.)

(B) THE FRONTLINE STATES, NIGERIA, AND GABON SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED:

- (1) TO URGE RESTRAINT ON SWAPO IN ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NAMIBIA;
- (2) NOT TO TAKE PUBLIC POSITIONS ON THE PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD BE UNHELPFUL;
- (3) NOT TO SET ARTIFICIAL DATES (LIKE THE JULY OAU MEETING IN KHARTOUM) FOR MOVEMENT ON THE NAMIBIA QUESTION.

(THE FIRST OF THESE TWO POINTS TO THE FRONTLINE STATES WOULD ALSO BE MADE TO SWAPO DIRECTLY.)  
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C) THE FIVE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE (JUSTIFIED TO SOUTH AFRICA ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEIR ACTIONS MADE THESE NECESSARY.)

6. AS THE DISCUSSION ENDED, WE ALL AGREED, IN ADDITION, THAT A FRONTLINE SUMMIT SHOULD NOT NOW BE SUGGESTED. THE SITUATION IS SIMPLY TOO

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FLUID AT THE MOMENT TO ANTICIPATE THE OUTCOME OF SUCH  
A SUMMIT.

7. WE WILL TRY TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS WITH THE  
ENTIRE GROUP ON FRIDAY. PERHAPS WE CAN  
DEVELOP SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR OWEN. YOUNG

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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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Sheryl P. Walter  
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